Can America Do It? by Walting, G.
Having suffered one military defeat after another since ther:outbreak
of the second World War, and being none too confident in the remaining
"t'l""""oll. nJ tho 'USSR, th" All•.,,, ""." /o7'Cl!d to t.alk mo7''' "mn m""." nEll"'t.
the distant future, in which, they hope, the American armaments will
co",,, ....to plallo Wh,at. l!h,a'1ll!1! ha1JQ thQ ura'lldiosQ pla'ns 01 the U'nitl!d
States of materializing?
NfJ Vlll$ w1ll wlld"nlitimu;t" "", c;apumly 01 dm"ric;..n iml",,,tTJI. Th"
wealth of raw materials in the USA is known. But to what degree is
American industry, grown up in an atmosphere of plenty, prepared tofulfill the dema.nds Of tne politicians of its country fOT arms and mOTe
arms, for production and more production, not only for America, but alsofor her weal'ened allies? What is the mental attitude Of ind~tstry, and
can it cover its requirements in raw material, machinery, and labor?
The interest of the whole world is focused on these questions and their
influence upon the initial speeding up of the American armament inclust·ry.
They are dealt with in the following article.
Tho a."tl,o,· left Amorica. ahortly be/oro tho ot<tbroa.l. of tho Pacifio
War. He spent many years in the United States working with an
industrial cO~lcern whose name is a household word throughout the
world.-K../tI.
THE strong point of American industry
is its mass production. Through
this method of manufacture, which is
not suitable for every product, it has
during the last twenty years promoted
one particular group of articles which
may be combined under the heading of
"aids to personal comfort." Starting
with automObiles, building materials,
heating and plumbing installations,
washing machines, refrigerators, radios,
electric stoves, radiators, and household
appliances, this list also includes the
products of the canning and packing
industries. A huge demand for all
these articles has been created in the
United States, and, as the manufacture
of them ensured good profits, the whole
trend of industrial development was
influenced accordingly. Even the purely
technical branches of industry, such as
the manufacture of machinery and
apparatuses, as well as steel, steel
plates, plastics, and enamel production,
had to adjust themselves to the
demands of the mass-production in-
dustries.
BUTTER INSTEAD OF GUNS
The share of automobiles and house-
hold goods in the total production was
rising constantly. The sales figures
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published for 19,10 or 4.4 million
motorcar:>, 2.6 million household refrig-
erators, 1.G million washing machin "
11 million radio, indicate clearly to
how gr a t a degree the factorie and
workshops of American industry 'were
bu 'y with the manufacture of these
good. Turnovers of such size not
only occupy the existing productiv
machinery and teclmical equil ment of
an industry, but al 0 mean the tying-
up of such raw materials as te 1,
copper, aluminum, brass, cadmium,
chromium, and others.
This trend of American industry can
easily be understood in a rich country
and in tim of peace. But it is note-
worthy that it was not disturbed lJy
the outbreak of the second World War
nor by the Lend-Lease policy of Roose-
velt in ] 940, indeed, not even in 1941.
As late as July 1941, General Motors
announced that its sales organization
had in the nine preceding months sold
more automobiles than ever before in
the history of the concern. Early' in
1941 the refrigerator industry report-
ed further increases in the numb r of
order, which \\ as 70 per cent higher
than the tlgure for 1940. Similar
successes in sal s were reported in
other indu trie. This phenomenon
was all the more surprising as the
'om e of Production Management"
the high st authority for supervising
national rearmament, admitted at the
very same time that armament cle-
li"eries were in arrears,
PO T-ll AR rvOfiBlf:S
The contradictory nature of these
n:purLs enable one to draw conclusions
a' to the fundamental attitude of
American industry. '1 his is, moreover,
confirmed by a pronouncement of Wil-
liam S. Knudsen, the chairman of the
Office of Production Management, who,
when asked whether American industry
were able to carry out the rearmament
program of the Government, answered
in the affirmath'e, with the reservation
that industry would-as had hitherto
not been the case-really use to the
full its resources for rearmament.
The utterance made during this
period by representatives of industry
only serve to confirm that the chang s
which 1\11'. Knud en hint at had not
yet taken place, At that time the
industrialist was occupied with the
problem of what would happen to
indu try and its employment aft l'
the war. How would the ·witch-ov· l'
from war-time to peace-time indu try
be made at the end of the war '! 'I his
was the question bein'" discussed every-
where in industrial circles and \ hi 'h
was cho en a the suuject for th main
report of the 1940 winter m ting of
the Institute of El drical Engine l'S.
In the autumn of 1941 the pre', r>-
ported the planning of building activ-
ities in 52 citie as a m asure of
practical unemployment relief to be
started when the war was ended.
SKEPTICAL CAPITAL
Capital saw no good pro pects of
profit in the situation obtaining.
Doubts were expressed on all sid's
regarding the advisability of increasing
industrial capacity by enlarging the
existing plants. If one bears in mind
that the problem of the ovcrcapaci ty
of industry had for years been the
subject of discussion in industrial circl s
and with the general public, and that
the lack of balance between production
and consumption was constantly giv n
as the main reason for unemployment
and the continual feeling of crisis in
the American market, one can under-
sland that the factory 0\\ ners showed
little SYIl1 pathy for the Government's
desire for enlarged uljJi.lcl Ly. There
was no inclination to invest, so the
initiati\e wa left to the State. The
same re:traint was expressed in the
unaccommodating terms of payment
demanded by exporters from thei l'
customer, from which it \Va mainly
the outh American countries who had
to suffer.
The Stock Exchange confirmed this
situation with increasingly low levels
in share and bond quotation q • The
downward tendency of the New
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York Stock Exchange, which had not
:stopped since the beginning of the
European conflict, ran parallel to the
-skepticism of financial circles and "the
uncertainty of industry. When in
August 1941, after days of surmise
and expectation, the news of the famous
meeting between Churchill and Roose-
velt on the Atlantic was released for
publication, the New York Stock Ex-
·change-a barometer famed for its
.accuracy in reflecting the mood of the
business world-reacted with a mini-
mum turnover. And the specter of the




In presenting this situation we have
outlined the mental attitude of Amer-
ican capitalism. But even presuming
that the pressure of present times and
the growing concentration of power in
Washington will succeed in overcoming
the existing egoism and the passive
resistance of the capitalists, there still
remain obstacles of a technical nature.
How is the raw material situation?
To what extent does the machinery
exist for such gigantic armament
orders as have been announced by
Washington? How much human labor
is there available to carry out these
plans and to run the machines7 How
is the industry of the United States,
running at such high speed for peace-
time requirements, to be stopped and
set in motion again for war require-
ments?
Let us first consider the question of
raw materials. Every industrial prod-
uct is made up of raw material and
labor. Hence the efforts of engineers
are directed toward designs that can
be manufactured with a minimum of
material and a minimum of labor.
Every improvement of a product at-
tempts to decrease either the con-
sumption of material or the share of
lauor. American and German engineer-
ing have approached this goal by
different roads. American products
represent an expenditure of material
unlimited in both quantity and quality,
with a minimum of labor. German
products are marked by a minimum of
raw material, while the expenditure in
labor is generally higher than in
America. In other words: American
industry places unlimited raw materials
at the disposal of its engineers, ,if
through the use of them the engineers
succeed in reducing the working hours
involved; German engineering, on the
other hand, saves raw materials even
at the cost of more labor.
REDUCE THE LABOR!
The development of such a trend
originates in the raw-material and
labor situation of a country. In the
United States it was given its impetus
by the existence of great wealth in
raw materials. Such a trend, however,
in the long run influences the entire
technical thought and structure of
industry. The American development
is expressed in the greater share of
material in almost all American prod-
ucts, in comparison with the same
products of German origin. The most
popular American car weighs 1.3 tons,
compared with 0.85 tons for the most
popular German car. The best-selling
refrigerator in the United States
weighs 300 pounds, as against the 165
pounds of the largest-selling model in
Germany. Transformers of German con-
struction are up to 40 per cent lighter
than American models, even 50 per
cent lighter as regards their oil con-
tent. Similar differences in weight
can be found in other manufacturing
groups.
Hence, in making comparisons, the
figures for raw-material capacities
should be adjusted in accordance with
the fact that American industry manu·
factures a smaller number of turbines,
generators, pumps, steel constructions,
etc., from a given quantity of raw
material, as obviously the material.
wasting constructions of American
industry cannot be redesigned overnight
to save material. American and German
engineers have been educated to different
ways of working by the trend in the
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development of their industries. The
German designer spends three quarters
of his time thinking about how to save
raw material, while the American
designer spends three quarters of his
time attempting to reduce the share of




America boasts of a steel capacity
of 81 million tons. This is a very
impressive figure, especially in times of
rearmament. However, these 81 million
tons contain an especially large share of
the products mentioned before as "aids
to personal comfort," since they consume
large quantities of steel plates and
sheets. This is a typical example of
how a manufacturing group has
developed its own raw material and
special machinery, namely, special
rolled steel and continuous strip mills.
The purchasing price of such a strip
mill is between 10 and 20 million
dollars. It represents, therefore, the
expenditure for a battleship. With all
their special gadgets for the difficult
manufacture of flawless, thin plates,
these plants are among the most com-
plicated and expensive technical con-
structions of modern heavy industry.
The Americans have developed this
branch of industry to an astonishing
perfection, and they possess far more
continuous strip mills than Europe in
proportion to the steel capacities of
these two continents.
Nothing would be more obvious than
to make use of these valuable machines
for the newly arisen tasks of rearma-
ment. But here it becomes apparent
to what degree the advanced speciali-
zation and mass production have in-
fluenced the construction of machines
and apparatuses. The investigations
made by the Government showed that
the use of. these strip mills for the
manufacture of urgently needed ship
plates and armor plates would only be
possible after considerable changes in
construction, which would require not
only time but also special workmen
and large quantities of iron. Of course,
the block rolling-mills can still be used
for the new purpose; but the adjoining
large strip mills cannot, in view of
their advanced specialization. It is
only by realizing these difficulties in
change-over that one can understand
the beated discussions that took place
last summer about the question of in-
creasing the already gigantic steel
capacity of the United States which




Equally competent experts and rep-
resentatives of the Government spoke
for and against the expansion of the
steel industry. Those in favor of ex-
pansion were of the opinion that the
redesigning of the existing plants would
be so difficult and require so much time
that it would be better to erect entire-
ly new plants, even if there were no
prospect of their being used later on.
The opponents of expansion backed
their argument with the claim that the
construction of new plants would, for
the time being, mean no increase in
production. On the contrary, the
demands upon labor and raw materials
during the period of new construction,
estimated at two years, would mean
additional consumption. These two
years, however, might be the decisive
ones. To increase the steel capacity
by 10 million tons, it was calculated,
the construction of the necessary new
plants would consume 4.1 million tons
of steel.
The question of increased capacity
has also a financial side. Considering
the high cost of the machinery needed
for steel production, the financing of
an additional production of 10 million
tons represents a vast undertaking.
The amount of capital required for
this expansion was estimated at 1 to
1.5 billion dollars. In this connection
the financers of the steel works recalled
former false speculations. The last
expansion, which had been completed
in the economic crisis of 1932, had led
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to only 19.5 per cent of the capacity
of the American steel works being used
in the same year. Even in the follow-
ing years, from 1933 to 1938, the steel
industry was never employed at more
than 50 per cent of capacity.
ALLIES MUST SUFFER
The continuous strip mill is an
example of the development of American
machinery as a result of the preference
for the manufactures of mass produc-
tion. It shows how, through large sales
figures, special plants came into being
which in their method of production are
bound rigidly to the final product. The
development of American machine tools
toward single-purpose machines repre-
sents a trend which dominates the
entire sphere of machine manufactur-
ing. Multispindle drills, special welding
machines, turret lathes, and shapers
are to be found in many industries.
An American author recently gave as
the reason for the difference between
German and American machine-tool
construction that the German designers
had, even ten years ago, always borne
the manufacture of armaments in mind.
Things are not as simple as this author
makes them out to be; however, the
difference-which in reality originates
in the different trend of developments
in the engineering of both countries-
does exist in so far as it applies to the
disadvantages of the one-purpose con-
struction for the present situation.
The one-sided employment of Ameri-
can machinery through the manufactur-
ing methods of mass production is an
important factor in the getting under
way of the American armament industry.
It is no wonder that the American
machine-tool factories are flooded with
orders far beyond their capacity. The
overemployment of the machine - tool
industry is an indication of the extent
of adjustment in all factories. How
great a shortage there was is shown
by the embargo placed by the American
Government last year on the export of
machine tools to Russia. Today it is
no secret that those machine tools were
placed in American plants during the
first attempts at expansion. The demand
for machine tools was so great that
no other way out could be found than
to confiscate the orders of·a future ally
in order to get the American factories
going.
AUTOMATIC CONTROL •..
At that time, however, it was only
a matter of starting the program of
naval construction approved by Con-
gress, that is, the construction of
warships, naval planes, docks, hangars,
etc., with the necessary workshops.
The United states certainly possesses
an important machine-tool industry;
yet she had to seize the Russian orders
for the extension of her Navy. How
much greater must be the shortage in
machine tools now that the program
has been enlarged to include a huge
air fleet, motorized divisions with 40,000
tanks, a complete new merchant
marine, the machine shops and ship-
yards necessary for this, and other
urgent war requirements.
The American method of production
and the products it preferred have
also exerted an influence on American
labor, its schooling and numbers. The
tendency of American engineering to
reduce the share of labor has led not
only to the development of single-
purpose machines but also to the
preference for automatic control. The
ensuing simplification in running the
machines made it possible to employ
unskilled workers and women. To-
gether with this the demand for skilled
labor decreased.
• •. AND THE LACK
OF SKILLED LABOR
In American industry there are no
special arrangements for schooling
skilled labor like the German apprentice
system. The usual practice is to let a
man learn his particular job in the
plant. The same is true for engineers;
they too must undergo a lengthy train-
ing within the plants before they are
properly employed. During the de-
pression years, that is, up to 1940,
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however, the expenditure for training
the younger generation had been
greatly curtailed in all branches of
industry, and new employment had
been reduced to a minimum. The re-
sult is that now, at a time of greatest
demand, the supply of skilled labor is
more limited than ever.
This situation can partly be blamed
on the attitude of the American factory
owner, who was willing to pay a high
premium for automatic control in his
machines, not only to reduce labor
hours, but also in order to become
independent of skilled labor. And it
is this anti-social attitude of the
factory owner which is the basis for
the engineer's important decision as to
the apportioning of the human and the
mechanical elements in his technical
constructions.
MEN AGAINST MACHINES
The extraordinary successes of the
Japanese against the Americans and
British have placed the importance of
fighting spirit and human courage as
opposed to weapons and armament in
the limelight of discussion. No better
example than the Battle of Hawaii
and the sinking of the British
battleships off Malaya could be given
to show that the right or wrong
distribution of duties between men and
machines may mean the difference
between victory and defeat. There are
parallels to this example in the field
of industry.
One can either make a rolling mill
completely automatic, leaving the run-
ning of it to. unskilled workmen who
only have to press a button at the
control table now and again, or one can
place more simple machines in the
hands of skilled workers whose ex-
perience replaces the work done by
automatic instruments. The product
of the automatic machine is not neces-
sarily always superior to the product
from the hands of the worker. This
can only be decided in each individual
case. But it is certain that the ex-
aggerated use of automatic control
reduced mechanical skill and decreased
the number of skilled workers in the
United States.
LIMITS OF SPECIALIZATION
Summing up we can say that speciali-
zation as developed in American in-
dustry has, through its one-sided pref-
erence for one group of products, led
to a condition of inflexibility. This
inflexibility applies to the training of
labor, the !,!xisting machinery, and even
the production of raw materials. To
this must be added the handicap that
American constructions and the entire
American industry are wasteful in the
use of materials.
Today we read about a quota system
in the distribution of raw materials
in the USA. Aluminum and chromium-
plated steel are being replaced by plastics
or porcelain. The manufacture of auto-
mobiles is being stopped. In the land
of plenty, gasoline and rubber are being
rationed.
So, in the end, the United States
herself, in a remarkably rapid change-
over, has supplied the most convincing
proof for the claim that an engineering
system designed to save raw materials
shows the way into the future. For
the American people, however, the late
awakening to these facts represents a
great hindrance on the dangerous path
of war which they are treading today.
